Is the Law of Reflux Valid? Evidence from Sweden 1878–1913 by Hortlund, Per
 
 
Is the Law of Reflux Valid?  







In the classical monetary debates, the Banking School held that notes 
would be equally demand-elastic whether supplied by many or a 
single issuer. The Free Banking School held that notes would be less 
demand-elastic if supplied by a single issuer. These assertions have 
rarely, if ever, been subject to more stringent statistical testing. In this 
paper I compare the elastic properties of the note stock of the Swed-
ish note banking system in 1878–1901 with those of the regime in 
1904–1914, when the Bank of Sweden held a note monopoly. Evi-
dence suggests that notes did not become less elastic after monopoli-
sation, thus lending support to the views of the Banking School.   
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A big issue in the 19th century classical monetary debates was the 
question of the elasticity of the currency.1 How should monetary in-
stitutions be arranged to make currency supply responsive to the 
“needs of trade”, increasing and decreasing with changes in demand? 
In the most classical of the debates, the British one, three views 
emerged known as those of the Currency School, the Banking School 
and the Free Banking School. The Currency School denied that there 
was any need for an elastic currency, and it favoured quantitative 
restrictions on note supply to stop the banks from overissuing. The 
Banking School held the opposite view, claiming that restrictions 
would be harmful since it would make the currency inelastic and 
unresponsive to needs. It would also be unnecessary, since note-
issuing banks – whether many or a single one – could not issue be-
yond what the public was willing to hold. There was a “law of re-
flux” at work – unwanted notes would always be returned to the is-
suer, either deposited with it or used to repay loans. The note stock 
would therefore always be demand-elastic. The law of reflux would 
be particularly effective, if the issuer adhered to the “real bills doc-
trine”, and only discounted commodity bills – bills drawn in ex-
change for commodities – of short maturity.  
The Free Banking School sided with the Banking School in hold-
ing that quantitative restrictions would be harmful to the “needs of 
trade”. However, it argued that it was crucial that there be many is-
suers, since notes would then be subject to the interbank clearing 
mechanism. Many issuers would speedily redeem each other’s notes 
through the clearing. By contrast, notes of a single issuer would be 
treated as base money and would therefore not be redeemed: they 
would either be reissued or deposited with the issuer. In the latter 
case notes would continue as a demand liability and be part of the 
banks’ reserves, which could trigger a credit expansion. Moreover, 
                                                      
1 On the 19th century monetary debates, see Smith [1936], White [1984], Sel-
gin and White (1994a), Schwartz (1992). On the modern theoretical literature 
on free banking, see the survey article by Selgin and White (1994b), and ref-
erences therein. 
  1banks would not have the incentive to repay loans if their borrowing 
rate (at the central bank) was below their lending rate – it would then 
be more profitable for them to re-issue the notes.  
Hence, demand-elasticity required many issuers. Unrestricted 
discretion would enable banks to accommodate peak demands for 
currency and hence make note supply “upward elastic”. Competition 
would ensure active redemption and hence make note supply 
“downward elastic”. With a single issuer (a central bank) demand-
elasticity would instead depend on the prudence of the central bank 
in its open- market operations. Even if the central bank increased 
supply during peak demands, notes would not automatically be 
withdrawn through the clearing once demand subsided. Crucially, 
the speed of redemption would increase. Historically, a note circu-
lated on average for 10 days in the Scottish free banking system, 
while a Bank of England note would circulate on average for 150 days 
(Gilbart 1882). Moreover, while in a competitive note banking system 
a note returned was a note redeemed, this was not so with a single 
issuer, since it could also be deposited and hence re-issued. For a sin-
gle issuer, the “speed of redemption” would be greater than the 
“speed of reflux”, wherefore notes would be upward elastic, but im-
perfectly downward elastic.  
The debates of the classical monetary schools have received much 
scholarly attention. However, there seems to be few studies that 
quantitatively test the merits of the claims involved. In particular, 
there are virtually no studies of how different note regimes affect the 
elasticity of the currency. An exception is Selgin and White (1994a), 
who show how elastic the note stock of the unrestricted Canadian 
note banking system was compared to the note stock of the American 
National Banking system, in the late 19th century. A problem is that 
competitive note banking regimes often ended before systematic 
bank statistics were collected. This is the case of Britain where it 
ended already in 1845, which is probably the reason why the elastic-
ity claims of the classical monetary schools have – to my knowledge –
not been tested.2  
                                                      
2 With regard to free banking, there is a growing empirical literature. Dowd 
(1992) surveys 60 historical instances of free banking. Recent negative as-
  2For this reason, the case of Sweden should be of interest. Between 
1878 and 1901, about twenty-five commercial banks called Enskilda 
banks issued notes, competing with the Bank of Sweden, until this 
bank gained a note monopoly in 1901–1904. The case of Sweden is of 
interest for three reasons. First, data are readily available: all com-
mercial banks were required to compile monthly balance statements 
to the Bank Supervisory Authority. Second, the Swedish experience 
of competitive note banking ended in the middle of the classical gold 
standard period 1870–1914, wherefore ceteris paribus conditions can 
be said to apply. Third, the Swedish system contained a peculiarity in 
the “return discount rate”. Banks could rediscount bills with the Bank 
of Sweden at a rate half a percentage point lower than the official 
discount rate. Banks had therefore potential access to a “money ma-
chine” that should have imparied the efficiency of the law of reflux.3 
Moreover, the Bank of Sweden adhered to the real bills doctrine in its 
discount policy, in that it would “avoid loan and accommodation 
bills”, and only discount bills with at most 45 days of maturity. All 
the classical doctrines of the Banking School – needs of trade, law of 
reflux, real bills – were thus represented  in the Swedish case, and 
their effects can be quantitatively assessed.  
This paper investigates the relative merits of the claims of the 
Banking School and Free Banking School. Does the law of reflux work 
equally well with a single issuer, as it does with many?. This is investi-
gated by comparing the elastic properties of the note stock of the un-
restricted note banking system in 1878–1901 with those in 1904–1914, 
when notes were supplied exclusively by the Bank of Sweden. Did 
the note stock become less elastic after monopolisation, and particu-
larly, less downward so? If the Banking School was right, and the law 
of reflux is always effective, then there should be no difference in 
note elasticity before and after monopolisation. If on the other hand 
the Free Banking School was right, then the note stock should become 
less demand-elastic after monopolisation.  
                                                                                                                             
sessments of historical free banking performance (in Australia and Switzer-
land) are presented in Hickson and Turner (2002) and Neldner (2003). On 
free banking in Sweden, see Ögren (2003), and Lakomaa (2004).  
3 Brisman (1931, p. 218) claims that the return discount rate was unique to 
Sweden.  
  32 Institutional  background 
This section briefly reviews the institutional framework relevant to 
the Swedish money and banking system in 1878–1914. In the latter 
half of the nineteenth century two types of institutes issued notes. 
Enskilda banks (Private banks) were commercial banks with unlimited 
liability. The Bank of Sweden was the bank of the parliament, which 
also acted as a commercial bank. The Bank of Sweden notes were 
legal tender by the Swedish constitution of 1809. There were about 25  
Enskilda banks, and they held a dominant position in the financial 
system. Their share of the note market was over 50 percent.  
The Enskilda banks were regulated by the Bank Law of 1874. The 
law stated cash and capital requirements that were linked to the note-
issuing rights.4 Enskilda bank notes were to be redeemed only into 
gold coin (and not into Bank of Sweden notes).  
The note-issuing rights of the Bank of Sweden were based on a 
“contingency system”. The bank was allowed to issue notes equal to 
its reserves (specie + foreign exchange) plus a fixed “contingency”. 
During the note competition period the contingency was highly sta-
ble: in 1879–1887 it was 35 million, and in 1888–1898 it was 45 million. 
With note monopolisation it rose steadily each year, particularly in 
the boom period of WWI.  
The clearing function of the Swedish banking system was pecu-
liar. In 1856 the Stockholms Enskilda Bank was started. It immedi-
ately began to act as a clearing bank for other note-issuing banks. 
However, the Skandinaviska Kreditaktiebolaget, a non-issuing bank, 
largely took over the clearing function in the 1860s, mainly because it 
offered better terms. There were thus two clearing banks in the pe-
riod 1878–1901, one of which did not issue notes.  
In 1897 a new bank law was promulgated that prescribed the 
monopolisation of notes by the Bank of Sweden. The transfer of the 
                                                      
4 To issue notes, gold reserves had to be at least 10 percent of paid-in capital. 
Enskilda bank notes were to be redeemed only into gold coin. The volume of 
notes outstanding could not exceed the sum of the bank’s holdings of: Colla-
teral for capital; Claims up to fifty percent of paid-in capital; and Gold exce-
eding ten percent of paid-in capital.  
 
  4Enskilda banks’ note stock to the Bank of Sweden occurred between 
January 1901 and January 1904. Clearing was now also taken over by 
the Bank of Sweden.  
 
Monetary policy of the Bank of Sweden, 1878–1914  
During the whole of the 19th century Sweden suffered from so called 
“transfer crises”, that is, external drains in times of liquidity crises 
abroad. The traditional policy of the Bank of Sweden during these 
crises was known as the “strangle system”. When an external drain 
occurred, the bank would contract it’s lending, not raise interest rates 
– a policy that caused sharp fluctuations in the volume of credit. The 
policy was to have a fixed discount rate. From 1890, however, the 
strangle system was abandoned for a more modern discount rate pol-
icy, when the Bank of Sweden began to adjust the discount rate rather 
than lending volumes to cope with external drains. Also, foreign ex-
change rather than gold was used to clear debts.  
According to Brisman (1931, p. 211), the Bank of Sweden held a 
position in the 1880s that was unique in the world. Whereas in most 
other countries the state bank had developed into a modern central 
bank – with a monopoly on notes, setting interest rates and acting as 
a bankers’ bank and a lender of last resort – the Bank of Sweden was 
still largely a commercial bank competing with other banks. It did not 
rediscount the bills of other banks. Mostly for commercial reasons 
(the Bank of Sweden could not compete with the Enskilda banks in 
the market for commercial loans), this policy was to change.  
In 1878/1879 the Bank of Sweden began to rediscount bills and 
extend bond-secured loans to banks that did not issue notes. In 1893 
the right to rediscount was extended to all banks. Commercial loans 
were from now on no longer extended. In 1897, after the promulga-
tion of the new bank law prescribing monopolisation, rediscounting 
grew in importance. In 1901 the Bank of Sweden declared that it 
would rediscount all acceptable bills presented by the commercial 
banks. In September 1905 it declared that it would only rediscount 
bills with less than forty-five days of maturity. It would also “avoid 
accommodation and loan bills” (Simonsson 1931, p. 39). This was an 
adherence to the real bills doctrine, according to which a central bank 
should only discount bills drawn in exchange for commodities.  
  53  Note elasticity before and after monopoli-
sation 
The merits of the claims of the classical monetary schools are tested 
by formulating “conjectures” regarding the consequences of note 
monopolisation that are implicit in the doctrines of the Free Banking 
School, and confronting them with data.  
3.1 Conjectures 
The Free Banking School held that note supply should be more de-
mand-elastic in an unrestricted note banking system, than in a central 
banking regime. Note monopolisation trades inter-bank clearing for 
central bank prudence. Due to “the information problem”, clearing is 
more efficient than prudence.5 The note stock might become upward 
inelastic if the central banker responds inadequately to increased cur-
rency demands.6 Even more likely, the note stock might become less 
downward elastic. Because the speed of redemption would decrease, 
notes would linger in circulation after an expansion, unless the cen-
tral banker prudently acts to withdraw the surplus notes. Even if 
notes are returned to the Bank of Sweden, they might become depos-
ited rather than redeemed, and hence continue “in circulation” as a 
demand liability – call this liability inelasticity. In sum, free banking 





                                                      
5 Selgin (1988, p. 89).  
6 The most famous instance is perhaps the Federal Reserve System, whose 
failure to act as a lender of last resort in the face of increased currency de-
mand, it has been argued, led to the debt-deflation crisis in 1932–1933 
(Friedman and Schwartz 1963, Timberlake 1993). Likewise, Miron (1986) 
attributes the absence of panics in 1915–1928 to Fed open market prudence 
in accommodating seasonal demands for loans and currency, while the pan-
ics in 1929–1933 is attributed to the Fed’s incomplete accommodation of   
those demands.  
  61. The note stock might become less upward elastic.  
2. The note stock might become less downward elastic.  
3. The demand liabilities of the Bank of Sweden might become less 
elastic.  
3.2 Data 
Data are from the Summary of the Bank Reports (Sammandrag af ban-
kernas uppgifter). These were monthly balance statements that all 
commercial banks were required to report to the Bank Supervisory 
Authority (Bankinspektionen). This paper intends to measure the de-
mand elasticity of the note stock. What is actually measured is the 
percentage change in the note stock. Obviously, a greater monthly 
change does not necessarily reflect that the note stock has become 
more demand-elastic. To measure the latter, knowledge of demand, a 
non-observable quantity, would be needed. An indirect way to mea-
sure demand-elasticity would be to look at interest rates. Miron 
(1986) measures call loan rates at the New York stock exchange in 
1890–1928, and argues that their smaller post-WWI seasonal variation 
reflects that currency supply became more demand-elastic after the 
Federal Reserve system was founded. Unfortunately, these kinds of 
market rates do not seem to be readily available for Sweden. What is 
available is the various loan rates of the banks. These are reported 
monthly and are included in the Summary Reports. However, they 
tended to be fairly stable over the year, and did not exhibit seasonal 
variation. As a “third best”, then, I measure the quantitative change 
in the note stock. Reasonably, if the seasonal expansions and contrac-
tions in the note stock became greater after monopolisation, then this 
could indicate that the note stock did not become less demand-elastic. 
Figure 1 shows the logged total note stock of the Swedish banking 
system (Bank of Sweden and Enskilda bank notes), 1878–1913.    































    Source: Summary of the Bank Reports.  
    Note: Monopolisation ocurred in 1901–1904.  
Monopolisation did not radically alter the behaviour of the note 
stock. Its path seems continuous with regard to trend, cycle and sea-
son. If anything, Figure 1 suggests that the note stock may have be-
come more elastic around the time of monopolisation. This is sup-
ported by Figure 2, which shows seasonal averages of the total note 
stock for the years 1880–1895 and 1904–1913, respectively.7 Seasonal 
averages have been calculated by means of maximum likelihood on 
the differenced logged note stock, with monthly dummies and four 
lags in the disturbance term. Seasonal averages have been normalised 
to express a month’s circulation as a ratio of the average (monthly) 
annual circulation. Specification is provided in the Appendix. Regres-
sion results are available on request.  
                                                      
7 From January 1880 to January 1896, and from January 1904 to January 1914, 
respectively.  
  8  Figure 2 Average note stock, 1880–1895 and 1904–1913.  
 
  ∆  p 
Jan  –0.059 0.000 
Feb  0.007 0.24 
Mar  0.050 0.000 
Apr  –0.040 0.000 
May  0.012 0.030 
Jun  0.034 0.000 
Jul  –0.084 0.000 
Aug  0.023 0.000 
Sep  0.099 0.000 
Oct  –0.029 0.000 
Nov  –0.012 0.13 
Dec  0.000 0.77   
 
  ∆  p 
Jan  –0.16 0.000 
Feb  0.020 0.001 
Mar  0.092 0.000 
Apr  –0.071 0.000 
May  –0.007 0.58 
Jun  0.081 0.000 
Jul  –0.089 0.000 
Aug  0.014 0.002 
Sep  0.12 0.000 
Oct  –0.049 0.000 
Nov  –0.035 0.000 
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 Source: Summary of the Bank Reports.  
Figure 2 strongly suggests that notes became more elastic after mo-
nopolisation. The note stock expanded more in the expansion months 
(March, June, September and December) in 1904–1913 than it did in 
1880–1895. It also contracted percentually more in the contraction 
months (January, April, July, October–November). This indicates that 
the note stock became both more upward and downward elastic after 
monopolisation. This is formally tested next.  
3.3  t-tests   
The means of the monthly changes in the periods 1880–1895 and 
1904–1913 are compared by way of t-tests. Monthly changes are ex-
pressed as the difference in the logged note stock. Upward elasticity 
  9is tested in the months of expansion (March, June, September and 
December). Likewise, downward elasticity is tested in the months of 
contraction (April, July, October and January). In the same way, it is 
investigated whether the demand liabilities of the Bank of Sweden 
became less elastic.  
Upward elasticity 
Table 1 confirms that the note stock actually became more upward 
elastic after note monopolisation.  
   Table 1  t-test of upward elasticity 
∆ Log Notes 
 
Obs. Mean  S.  D.  p 
March 1880–95 16  0.053  0.027  
 1904–13  10  0.097  0.0080   
 Difference    0.044    0.0000 
June 1880–95  16  0.036  0.018   
 1904–13  10  0.083  0.014   
 Difference    0.047    0.0000 
September 1880–95  16  0.095  0.021   
 1904–13  10  0.12  0.017   
 Difference    0.025    0.0036 
December 1880–95  16 0.0079 0.019   
 1904–13  10  0.077  0.030   
 Difference    0.069    0.0000 
   Note: p-values for two-sided test of zero difference.  
In the months of expansion, the difference in means is positive in 
every month. The difference is largest in December, and smallest in 
September. The difference is statistically significant at the one percent 
level for all four months.  
Downward elasticity 
The note stock also became more downward elastic after monopolisa-
tion, as Table 2 shows.  
  10   Table 2  t-test of downward elasticity.  
∆ Log Notes 
 
Obs. Mean  S.  D.  p 
April 1880–95  16  –0.039  0.019   
 1904–13  10  –0.072  0.0054   
 Difference    –0.033    0.0000 
July 1880–95 16  –0.078  0.021  
 1904–13  10  –0.090  0.012   
 Difference    –0.012    0.088 
October 1880–95  16  –0.031  0.022   
 1904–13  10  –0.049  0.013   
 Difference    –0.018    0.013 
January 1880–95  17  –0.061  0.026   
 1904–13  11  –0.15  0.023   
 Difference    –0.087    0.0000 
    Note: p-values for two-sided test of zero difference.  
The difference in means is negative for all four months. The differ-
ence is largest in January, and smallest in July. The difference is sig-
nificant at the one percent level in every month except July. 
Liability inelasticity  
Figure 3 shows the seasonal variation in the demand liabilities of the 
Bank of Sweden, 1880–1895 and 1904–1913. Demand liabilities are 
defined as the sum of the notes and the folio account (from 1904 
called the giro account). Seasonal averages have been calculated in 
the same way as with notes (regression results are available on re-
quest).   
  11Figure 3  Seasonal variation in demand liabilities of the  
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Source: Summary of the Bank Reports.  
Figure 3 strongly suggests that demand liabilities of the Bank of Swe-
den did not become more inelastic after monopolisation. Most con-
spicuous are the months of March–April and September–October. 
Before monopolisation, aggregate demand liabilities actually increased 
in April and October, when the note stock decreased. This suggests 
that notes were deposited with the Bank of Sweden, swelling the folio 
account, instead of being redeemed. That liability elasticity actually 
increased after monopolisation is confirmed by Table 4, which shows 
test results for upward and downward elasticity.  
  12Table 3 t-tests of upward and downward elasticity: change in 
the log of Bank of Sweden demand liabilities, 1880–1895 and 
1904–1913.  
Upward elasticity 
  Obs.  Mean S.  D.  p 
March 1880–95 16  0.034  0.060   
 1904–13  10  0.092  0.032   
 Difference    0.059    0.0036 
June 1880–95  16  –0.021  0.039   
 1904–13  10  0.061  0.031   
 Difference    0.082    0.0000 
September 1880–95  16  0.044  0.029   
 1904–13  10  0.094  0.017   
 Difference    0.050    0.0000 
December 1880–95  16  0.059 0.035   
 1904–13  10  0.12  0.037   
 Difference    0.061    0.0005 
Downward elasticity 
  Obs.  Mean S.  D.  p 
April 1880–95  16  0.0097  0.048   
 1904–13  10  –0.055  0.011   
 Difference    –0.064    0.0001 
July 1880–95  16  –0.034  0.040   
 1904–13  10  –0.071  0.022   
 Difference    –0.038    0.0053 
October 1880–95  16  0.0042  0.042  
 1904–13  10  –0.019  0.011   
 Difference    –0.023    0.051 
Jan 1880–95  17  –0.050  0.042   
 1904–13  11  –0.17  0.021   
 Difference    –0.12    0.0000 
   Source: Summary of the Bank Reports.   
  13Table 3 confirms that demand liabilities became more upward elastic 
in the expansionary months. The difference in elasticity is positive 
and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Demand liabilities 
also became more downward elastic. The difference is negative in all 
contraction months. It may be noted that demand liabilities actually 
increased in April and in October, in 1880–1895.  
4  Discounted bills and loans of the Bank of 
Sweden, 1878–1914  
The Bank of Sweden allowed the commercial banks to borrow in two 
ways: by rediscounting bills and by extending bond-secured loans. 
Since the Bank of Sweden’s policy after 1905 was to rediscount only 
commodity bills with less than 45 days of maturity, it would be inter-
esting to see whether any difference in the demand-elasticity of the 
two assets can be detected. According to the real bills doctrine, com-
modity bills should be more closely correlated with the “needs of 
trade” for payments media, than should other forms of credit. This is 
because the paying merchant would later resell the commodities and 
hence redeem the bill. Commodity bills were therefore thought to be 
self-liquidating. Although the doctrine has been influential among 
bankers (Thunholm 1962, p. 88), and also been a guiding principle of 
monetary policy, it has been branded a fallacy by economists (Mints 
1945, p. 25, Humphrey 1986, Timberlake 1993, p. 259). Figure 4 shows 
the log of the sum of bills and loans, 1878–1914.  
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   Source: Summary of the Bank Reports.   
The aggregate volume of bills and loans exhibit a clear structural 
break at the time of the new bank law in 1897. Before that time, there 
was little cyclical or seasonal movement. Bills and loans became 
much more cyclical and sesonal after monopolisation in 1904. Was 
the Bank of Sweden’s volume of bills more closely correlated with the 
seasonal fluctuations in notes and demand liabilities, than was the 
volume of loans?  Figure 5 provides “close-ups” of bills and loans 
presented separately, for the period 1904–1913.   
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    Source: Summary of the Bank Reports.  
Both bills and loans exhibit clear seasonal movements that seem to 
correlate highly with the movements in payments media. To test 
which one was the strongest co-mover, I compare the correlations of 
the differenced logs of bills and loans with those of notes and de-
mand liabilities. Table 6 presents correlations and also partial correla-
tions for the periods 1880–1895 and 1904–1913.8  
                                                      
8 Partial correlations attempts to estimate the correlation between two vari-
ables if the other variables are held constant. See Greene (2000, p. 233).  
  16Table 4 Correlations of differenced logs of notes, demand liabilities, 
bills and loans of the Bank of Sweden, 1880–1895 and 1904–1913.  
 Correlations  Partial  correlations 
  Bills   Loans   Bills  Loans 
1880–1895  Notes  0.28 0.39 0.19 0.33 
  Liabilities  0.33 0.28 0.26 0.21 
1904–1913  Notes  0.80 0.75 0.58 0.44 
  Liabilities  0.87 0.78 0.73 0.46 
Source: Summary of the Bank Reports.  
Note: All coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level.  
As expected, correlations were lower in 1880–1895 than they were 
after monopolisation. Loans were then actually more correlated with 
the note stock, than were bills. The period 1904–1913 is more interest-
ing, since the Bank of Sweden then pursued monetary policy in ac-
cordance with the real bills doctrine. Indeed, in this period bills were 
more correlated with both notes and demand liabilities than were 
loans. Loans were more correlated with notes in 1880–1895, when the 
Bank of Sweden did not restrict discounting to commodity bills of 
short maturity. But in 1904–1913, when this was the case, bills moved 
more closely with the “needs of trade” for payments media, than did 
bond-secured loans. This result may be interpreted as support to the 
view of the Banking School and the real bills doctrine.  
5 Conclusions   
This paper compared the elastic properties of the Swedish note stock 
before and after notes were monopolised by the Bank of Sweden in 
1901–1904, in light of the doctrines expounded by the classical 
schools of monetary thought. The investigation warrants the follow-
ing conclusions.  
  1. The note stock did not become less elastic after monopolisa-
tion. Data show that note supply became more upward elastic in the 
expansion months of March, June, September and December, as well 
as more downward elastic in the contraction months of April, July, 
October and January.  
  17  2. Neither did the demand liabilities of the Bank of Sweden be-
come less elastic. Before monopolisation, demand liabilities actually 
increased in the contractionary months of April and October. This 
suggests that Bank of Sweden notes were deposited rather than re-
deemed in this period. Demand liabilities became more elastic after 
monopolisation.  
  3. In addition, when the Bank of Sweden acted in accordance 
with the real bills doctrine and only discounted commodity bills of 
short maturity in 1904–1913, bills varied more closely with the vol-
umes of notes and demand liabilities. This suggests that real bills are 
more correlated with the “needs of trade” for payments media, com-
pared to  other forms of credit.  
  In sum, results seem more conducive to the views of the Banking 
School, than to those of the Free Banking School. The withdrawal of 
notes from the inter-bank clearing mechanism did not have the det-
rimental effects on elasticity that might be conjectured from the think-
ing of the Free Banking School. All of the principles of the Banking 
School – the law of reflux, needs of trade, the real bills doctrine – find 
support in the Swedish data.  
  As an alternative to the general efficiency of the law of reflux, the 
results may be explained by the Bank of Sweden becoming more pro-
fessional in its operations around the time of monopolisation. Before, 
the organisation was more bureacratic in its decisions, with little re-
gard for market conforming policies (Brisman 1931). Also, the bank-
ing system became more organised at the turn of the 20th century. 
Banks had more branches, and deposits grew in importance – people 
would deposit cash balances rather than holding on to them. To see 
whether the Swedish development was a general phenomenon or 
peculiar to it, it would be worthwhile to compare the development of 
elasticity in countries with and without note monopoly over the 
whole period of the classical gold standard. For the moment, the 
Banking School has the upper hand.  
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  20Appendix  
 
Specification of regressions and calculations of seasonal components 
for notes and demand liabilities.   
The following model was estimated:  
u Dec Feb Jan Notes Log + + + + = ∆ 11 2 0 ... β β β ,       (A1) 
where  
t t t t t t u u u u u ε + + + + = − − − − 4 3 2 1 .            ( A 2 )  
A value for each month vi was then calculated as 









j i i v
v
β β
    .            ( A 6 )  
The seasonal component si was then calculated as 




1 j i i v v s .              ( A 7 )  
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